

GENDARMERIE
Judicial Detachment
Military Auditorat¹
Palais de Justice
1000 BRUSSELS
02/508.60.11

Report. No. 652

Case:

Count of:
Assassinations

?
Hearing of Vincent
André

[Continuation of] the
dossier No. 02 02545
C8 of the Prosecutor
Serviceman in Brussels

Mr. Ver Elst-Reul

++STAMP++
MILITARY
AUDITORAT
BRUSSELS

09 MAY 1994

(1) Cross out the
inappropriate wording

PRO JUSTITIA

On this day of 6 May, nineteen hundred and ninety-four at 0855
We, the undersigned party Artiges Guy, warrant officer - OPJ²
of the gendarmerie

In residence in Brussels – Military Auditorat

In civilian clothes (1)

report that I visited the neighbourhood of Reine Elisabeth in Evere,
where we met and heard the following party at the above dates and
time:

Vincent André, Jules, Alex
born in Ixelles on 07/10/1941
Domiciled at Chemin du Pachy 10 at
1328 Lasne

Colonel – Reg. No. 94689 –
CTM³ mission chief in Rwanda.

Who declared to us:

“I wish to express myself in French.

With regard to the attack against the aircraft of the President of
Rwanda, no rumours had been heard previously. This was a surprise
to everyone.

Afterwards, I received an item of information from the director of
the Rwandan oil company (Société Générale des Pétroles) in
Mwanza (Tanzania). This was a plot hatched by Hutu extremists,
including soldiers, the chief of which was General Nsabimana.
According to the same individual, President Habyarimana was aware
of the existence of the plot, and knowing who was the mastermind,
had obliged him to board his plane. The President had also ensured
that he was accompanied by the President of Burundi in order to
avoid an attack.

My personal conviction is that this was a Rwandan affair, intended
to sink the Arusha accords.

¹ A Belgian institution
which combines the
figure of Public
Prosecutor with the War
Council

² OPJ – judicial police officer

³ CTM – Military-Technical Cooperation?

To the extremists, these agreements meant the taking of power by the Tutsis in the medium term, which they absolutely wished to avoid.

To my knowledge, neither the FAR nor the FPR had ground-to-air missiles.

As individual arms, the FAR had Chinese AK-47s, FALs, South African R4s and German G3s. With regard to bayonets, they were traditional except for the Chinese gun, which had an in-built socket bayonet.

With regard to the '1000 Collines' radio, I can say that it is at the root of anti-Belgian feeling. The anti-Belgian campaign started towards the end of November 1993.

I never met Ruggiu, who, it seems, was very discreet and avoided contact.

With regard to the assassination of our 10 paratroops, I am unable to tell you anything since at the time I was in Tanzania.

I confirm the comments of Lt.-Col. Beaudoin in the sense that General Nsabimana and other high-ranking soldiers guaranteed that Arusha would not take place and that they were ready to thwart any action by the FPR.

On the airport, I had a discussion around 15/04/94 with Major Mutabera, who told me clearly that one had to understand them, that they had to apply the "final solution". He told me this after I told him that these massacres would not help them internationally.

I would also add that the anti-Belgian feeling had been developed by those who didn't want an Arusha accord. They thus wanted the MINUAR to leave in order to have a free hand.

For them, Arusha represented the taking of power by the Tutsis.

I cannot see that I have anything else to say for the time being.

(After reading, he remained and signed our information register).

In witness whereof.
++SIGNATURE++